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Abstract 
The Agency Costs resulting from the conflict between principals and agents, due to the separation of ownership 
and control in the capitalist enterprise, was analyzed in many works of the last century. Could we assume that 
the current globalization of companies has increased the differences between principals and agents? Does this 
scenario lead to an increase in Agency Costs in those companies with the greatest presence in the global 
economy? The objective of this article is to compile studies that will allow us to answer these questions 
affirmatively and conclude that large transnational, multinational or global companies involve higher Agency 
Costs than those that remain within national borders. 
Keywords: Agency, agents, control, costs, monitoring, principals.  
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Resumen 
Los costos de agencia devenidos del conflicto entre principales y agentes, a causa de la separación de la 
propiedad y el control en la empresa capitalista, fue objeto de análisis en múltiples trabajos del siglo pasado. 
¿Pudiéramos suponer que la globalización actual de las empresas ha acrecentado las diferencias entre 
principales y agentes? ¿Nos lleva este escenario al aumento de los costos de agencia en aquellas empresas con 
mayor presencia en la economía global? El presente artículo tendrá como objetivo realizar una recopilación de 
estudios que permitan responder afirmativamente a estas preguntas y concluir que las grandes empresas 
transnacionales, multinacionales o globales, involucran Costos de agencia superiores que aquellas que se 
mantienen dentro de las fronteras nacionales.  
 Palabras clave: Agencia, agentes, control, costos, monitoreo, principales. 
1. Introduction  
Although the twentieth century has gone down in history because of the great scientific discoveries, the two 
World Wars, the emergence and development of large companies and industries that spread throughout the 
world with the impetus of globalization, among other important events that carried out during those 100 years. 
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Also all this contributed to the emergence of the problem that is addressed in the present work and that has to 
do explicitly with the separation of ownership and control in large companies and the conflicts that this 
generates. 
Until the nineteenth century, both ownership and control were concentrated in the figure of the capitalist or 
entrepreneur, absolute owner of the means of production. But this situation was evolving as companies grew 
and the so-called dispersion of capital in shares and capital markets, which are nothing but a way and a space 
where the owner of capital can exchange his ownership in shares, partially or totally by liquid capital and reinvest 
this either in the company or in another business. 
In this way companies ceased to be the absolute property of a person to become the property of several 
individuals, limiting the performance of the will of each of them. This caused that the capitalist as owner and 
director of the company, could be freed of the executive functions and devote to enjoy the benefits of the 
business, leaving his position to a General Manager capable of making the decisions, managing and 
representing the interests of all owners. 
This phenomenon began to attract the attention of experts and researchers in the early thirties by the magnitude 
that was gaining. Thus, studies like those of Berle and Means (1932) were published, where they addressed the 
situation of shared capital among several shareholders in large companies, which made them owners of a smaller 
or greater part of it but limited them in terms of decision making. It took shape what we know today as the 
Theory of the Agency, in which the authors identified different interests between principals (owners, 
shareholders) and agents (managers, administrators). 
Almost a century has passed since the emergence of this separation, but far from being solved differences have 
increased, product of the excessive growth of companies and internationalization, which has forced even the 
most capable and conservative to put control of their signatures in the hands of others, given the impossibility 
of being everywhere, knowing about everything, or what is the same, having information asymmetries that for 
Fama and Jensen (1983), are the main reason why problems of the agency persist. 
As a result of the lack of confidence on the part of principals towards managers, due to the rationality of the 
latter, which could lead them to act opportunistically /Barney and Ouchi 1986), the agency costs increase and 
the clear establishment of rules and procedures for decision-making along with external controls that minimize 
the conflict of interest between shareholders and administrators (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). 
2. Background of the problem 
The challenges of globalization have led millions of companies to embark on the conquest of international 
markets, turning them into large multinationals and transnationals with a presence in most markets and a major 
role in global finance. But before this event took unimaginable magnitudes and many authors were concerned 
and occupied the gap that opened between ownership and control or between principals and agents. 
Berlet and Means (1962) in their book The Modern Corporation and Private Property, took on the task of 
identifying the problems caused by the separation of ownership and control, becoming pioneers in this research 
topic. In their study they warn about the concentration of economic power caused by the increase of the big 
corporation and the emergence of a powerful class of professional managers, isolated from the pressure not 
only of the shareholders, but also of the general public. 
They conclude that the structure of corporate law in the United States in the 1930s reinforced the separation of 
ownership and control and that there was no longer any certainty that in a corporation essentially the interests 
of the shareholders were executed, since the managers had sufficient independence to pursue their own 
interests, even if they were partially opposed to those of the shareholders. This study was framed in North 
American companies and constituted a mandatory reference on the subject until the seventies. 
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Jensen and Meckling, (1976) in their study entitled Theory of the Firm: Management Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, address the conflict of interests between principals and agents, from the perspective that 
many owners of firms in the market, deliver voluntarily their companies under the tutelage of an administrator, 
establishing complex contractual relationships between them that limit the actions of both parties. The levels of 
these relationships depended on the legal and regulatory framework and the determination of restrictive clauses 
that committed the agent to perform services for the benefit of the principal. The principal delegated to the 
agents’ decisions that granted them some authority. All this resulted in an increase in agency costs. 
The authors acknowledge that both principals and agents are utility maximizers and will look after their own 
interests, so the principal will establish incentives to align the interests of the agent and will incur monitoring 
costs. Likewise, the agent will use resources to signal the principal acting according to his interests. So, as long 
as there are divergences between principals and agents, there will be no possible way to find zero costs by 
aligning the interests of the agent with those of the principal. This study has some limitations that basically start 
from the assumptions that are assumed, where it can be found that: There is no tax, that external shareholders 
do not have the right to vote, that the owner's wages and the size of the firm are fixed and that it is not possible 
to carry out monitoring or guarantee activities. 
Another study that deals with the issue of the agency with great depth is that of Fama and Jensen, (1983) titled, 
Separation of property and control, where they explain that the survival of certain organizations is characterized 
by the separation of ownership and control and that this problem can occur both in large organizations and in 
much smaller ones. They agree with other authors that the agency's problems persist thanks to information 
asymmetries between principals and agents. In addition, they affirm that organizations are based on the 
relationship that is established through contracts and that they are divided into written and not written. These 
are signed between the owners of the factors of production and customers, thus establishing the "rules of the 
game" or the rights of each agent in the organization. 
For them, problems in organizations are aggravated when the process of making important decisions rests with 
the administrators, who are not precisely the residual claimants or owners of the company and, therefore, do 
not have a significant share of the wealth generated or not your decisions. This causes an increase in the agency's 
costs, due to the structuring and monitoring of contracts between agents with conflicting interests. For agency 
problems to manifest, according to Arrow, (1991) in his study the economics of agency, it is necessary that there 
are situations of asymmetric information, under two fundamental assumptions that he describes as: First, that 
he finds hidden information or adverse selection. One of the parties knows something that the other ignores, 
and second, that there are hidden actions or moral hazard. One of the parties carries out actions in order to 
maximize its usefulness to the detriment of the other party. 
Authors such as Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998), published the article entitled Management and ownership effects: 
evidence from five countries, where they recognize two situations related to ownership and control that can 
create agency costs: The first, when executives commit themselves short-term high-cost activities, designed to 
obtain extra remuneration, other than salary that reduce corporate profitability and increase costs, and the 
second, occurs if managers seek to satisfy their needs for power, prestige and status through of long-term 
strategic decisions that increase the size of the company but not its corporate results. 
  
Theoretical - conceptual review 
 Agency costs are those that are generated because of information asymmetries between principals and agents 
when there is a separation between ownership and control. These costs are derived from monitoring contracts 
and controlling the behavior of agents by the principals. While agents involve costs to send signals that they are 
worthy of the principal's trust, (Peng 2010). 
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According to the strategic approach, the internationalization of companies is the result of the adoption of a 
series of strategies in which both the resources and capabilities of the company and the opportunities and 
threats of the environment are considered. The internationalization of companies is the process by which a 
company participates in the reality of globalization, that is, the way in which the company projects its activities 
totally or partially, to an international environment and generates commercial, financial or of knowledge 
between different countries (Araya 2009). 
It should be clear that the separation of ownership and control is an inherent problem in firms that operate both 
internally and outside of a country, but for the purposes of this paper the behavior of the problem will be 
analyzed in those that go beyond national borders. It is prudent to clarify that there are several classifications 
for these firms that begin to have a presence in different countries and markets. 
Although there are discrepancies among the authors regarding the following types, for the Understanding of 
the present work will be established as follows: 
A. International companies: Are those that export or import goods. They do not have a relevant presence in 
the destination country and are not interested in adapting their products to the needs of the country that 
receives them. Rather, it takes advantage of cultural distance. 
B. Multinational companies: Are those with a global focus in terms of markets, have presence in 2 or more 
countries and not only export, but also perform productive activities in those countries. They follow 
strategic plans of domain of markets that are made and directed in a centralized manner and tend not to 
accept local investors. 
C. Transnational corporations: Those that have a presence in many countries where they usually establish 
subsidiaries or franchises that do not have the same legal personality as the parent company, usually 
located in the country of origin. This type of companies can accept investors from all countries where they 
are present. 
D. Global companies: Are those with the capacity to act in any country in the world because they see the 
planet as a single market. They can have a unique headquarters from where all the strategies start in a 
general way, but then each country adapts the products or services according to the culture, language, 
idiosyncrasies and needs of local consumers. 
The concepts or characteristics of these companies have an important relationship with this work because, due 
to the magnitude and cost of the operations they carry out, the diversity of scenarios where they have presence 
and the high levels of uncertainty and risk with which they work make them firm representatives of the 
separation of ownership and control and the unlimited increase of agency costs. 
At present, many companies follow business initiatives that lead them to compete outside their borders. For 
Peng (2012) this behavior is defined as the combination of proactive innovation and the search for risks that run 
when overcoming national borders in order to generate value for the organization. All this can be achieved in 
three fundamental ways according to the author: Through direct Exports, by the establishment of franchises or 
licenses and by direct foreign investment, understand (alliances, wholly-owned subsidiaries and / or foreign 
acquisitions). 
The international presence in one or several countries invariably leads to an increase in agency costs that could 
be divided into four fundamental concepts according to Arruñada, (1990). 
A. Costs of formalization: Design and drafting of contracts in which the obligations of the parties are detailed. 
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B. Supervision costs: incurred by the principal for the selection of the right person before the signing of the 
contract and after the signature of the latter, to control the activity of the agent. 
C. Guarantee costs: Subscribed by the agent to guarantee the principal that he will not carry out harmful 
actions for him. 
D. Residual loss: It is in which the principal incurs by the decisions adopted by the agent and that deviate from 
those agreed in the contract. 
3. Review of the empirical literature 
Although the current studies have not sufficiently explored the influence that could have for the agency costs 
that the companies grow towards international markets, the intuition about the phenomenon of business 
globalization has led some authors to establish empirical the existing relationship between agency costs and 
internationalized companies. An investigation by Lee and Kwok (1988) helps to begin to understand the 
relationship mentioned above. Its study is based on a comparison between multinational companies and 
domestic companies regarding the influence of some international environmental factors on the capital 
structure. The costs of agency and bankruptcy costs were taken as determining factors of the capital structure. 
One of the most important findings of this research argues that, due to the complexity of international 
operations, agency costs tend to increase with respect to companies that operate in domestic markets because 
of surveillance and linking activities of multinationals. These activities are mainly audit and preparation of 
multiple financial statements for each country in which the company has operations. As the subsidiaries of 
multinationals are located in different countries, with different national accounting standards it is more difficult 
and more difficult to prepare consolidated financial statements. Alternatively, geographic dispersion also 
substantially increases audit costs. 
Mention may also be made of the research work carried out by Martínez and Tejerina (1999) on International 
Acquisitions and Control in Spanish Industrial Companies, where, although the topic of analysis of this work is 
not addressed directly, if it is explained how it works from the point of view of the acquisitions of companies, 
which we have already identified as a way to internationalize the firm. For them, acquisitions are ways to execute 
foreign direct investments, which causes the growth of firms and limits managers to establish optimal control 
systems and to obtain relevant and necessary information, which minimizes delegating decision rights in 
individuals more prepared and better informed about the new environment. This inevitably results in increased 
agency costs. The results of this work were based on a sample of 298 acquisitions of Spanish industrial 
companies between 1991 and 1994. 
In the study conducted by Fortuna (1999), it states that in the case of large corporations there is a double agency 
relationship as a result of the transfer of powers of the shareholders to the Board of Directors and from this to 
the senior management. In addition, he affirms, based on the theories of the management school, that the 
mismatch of interests between internal and external shareholders, the difficulty of oversight and the large size 
of the corporation increase the agency problem and result in the management going to have an incentive 
towards opportunistic behavior, pursuing the satisfaction of their own objectives, which will mean a deviation 
from the financial objective of the company, to the detriment of the vast majority of shareholders (the external). 
Works such as Chang and Taylor (1999) analyze how in complex organizations of multiple business units, the 
manager of a large corporation can be seen as the principal since it is the manager in charge of watching over 
the interest and the correct functioning of the company, an organization as a whole, while the managers of 
several subunits held by the corporation identify themselves as agents. This is known as an extended agency 
relationship, where the managers of the subunits can try to maximize their own interest and the interest of their 
subunits, even though this may have a negative implication for the corporation. It is evident how the 
geographical, cultural and national adaptation between the headquarters and its foreign subsidiaries can 
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increase the uncertainty of the corporation about the decisions taken by its subsidiaries and increase agency 
costs. 
Authors such as Egelhoff (1984); Baliga and Jaegar (1984) and the own Chang and Taylor (1999) defend the 
criterion in their work of being able to monitor the subsidiaries through the control of personnel, that is, through 
the appointment of managers or directors who come from the country in which the headquarters is located (the 
expatriates). This is consistent with the concept of behavior control, where it is expected that expatriate 
managers and directors are more likely to act in the interests of headquarters than foreign managers. But 
information asymmetries could act negatively in these cases and the possibility of opportunism by national 
managers would continue to be present, as well as the country's limitations regarding the employment of foreign 
personnel to the detriment of nationals and the costs of agency. 
In research such as that of Wright, Madura, and Wiant (2002), an analysis is performed using data from the 
capital market to empirically examine the theory that multinational companies with greater exposure to foreign 
markets incur higher agency costs than the multinationals less exposed and then the domestic corporations. For 
this, they use an event study methodology to measure the abnormal returns associated with four separate 
events: (1) debt offers; (2) share offers; (3) organizational restructuring; and (4) takeover defenses. The results of 
the four events studies and their associated cross sections allow you to validate the main hypothesis that 
multinational firms with greater presence in foreign markets experience higher agency costs than multinational 
companies or less exposed domestic corporations. 
It is also pertinent to compile in this article the results of the study conducted by Doukas and Pantzalis (2003) 
where, among other issues, the effect of debt agency costs on the leveraging of 6951 multinationals and US 
nationals is discussed, during the period between 1988 and 1994. This paper concludes that there is a negative 
effect of debt agency costs on long-term leverage, being significantly higher for multinational companies than 
non-multinationals, which indicates that this type of companies they are subject to higher debt agency costs 
than companies without operations abroad. This is consistent with the view that multinational corporations are 
prone to higher agency costs than domestic companies because their greater geographic diversity causes 
difficulties in gathering and processing information, in addition to making monitoring more expensive than of 
national companies. 
Therefore, it is expected that the inherent agency problem between the shareholders and the bondholders will 
be aggravated by the geographical distances of the multinationals and, therefore, the bondholders will require 
higher interest payments on loans to companies that they are more susceptible to information asymmetries and 
higher supervision costs. 
Another study by Mustapha (2011), conducted in Malaysia, which analyzed the behavior of monitoring costs in 
235 multinational firms, using as a reference the levels of supervision implemented by these companies, mainly 
taking internal and external audits as study components; It showed that companies with multinational status 
have significantly more external audit costs. This result coincides with previous studies and can be explained by 
the need for an independent insurance system to control the operations of foreign subsidiaries in the 
multinational environment and proving that external auditors are seen as more independent than internal 
auditors. 
The results validate the thesis of the increase in agency costs in multinational companies, since we understand 
that the costs of monitoring are in themselves agency costs. 
4. Research method 
For the development of this research on the costs of agency in international companies, a descriptive and 
explanatory study was carried out, since the concepts related to this topic are described, as well as a review on 
the emergence of the agency theory and to compile different empirical investigations that explain the influence 
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and behavior of this type of costs, when the companies transcend their national borders and expand towards 
foreign markets. 
5. Analysis of results 
All the studies reviewed in this article show similar results, despite having been applied in different countries, 
geographical areas and types of companies. All authors agree in some way that there is a close relationship 
between the growth of companies outside their borders and the agency costs they incur. In that as they are 
expanding and locating in different countries and markets, the conflicts between principals and agents increase, 
making it more and more difficult to supervise and monitor the behavior of managers or administrators. 
Negative effects of debt agency costs on long-term leverage are also observed, being significantly higher for 
multinational companies than for national ones. This effect of debt agency costs on leverage increases with the 
degree of participation of companies in foreign markets. 
6. Conclusions and recommendations 
The information gathered in this article allows to know a little more about the emergence and development of 
the theory of the agency, as a result of the separation of ownership and control, a gap that tends to increase 
when companies grow and internationalize. It also reflects the upward behavior of agency costs in these 
companies under analysis. This increase in the costs of agency in companies that transcend many borders, it can 
affirm that it occurs due to the geographical distance that causes difficulties to gather and process the 
information, in addition to being able to monitor the behavior of the agents through internal audits as well as 
externally. It is more expensive and there is also a gradual increase in the uncertainty of corporations about the 
decisions taken by their subsidiaries in the rest of the world. 
 
 If all the results of the studies gathered in this study are interrelated, it is possible to affirm that as domestic 
companies move their operations to more foreign markets, agency costs gradually increase, So, if taken the 
concepts as reference of companies mentioned in this paper, global companies will incur in higher costs than 
multinationals and transnationals and these are higher costs than international ones. And each one of them will 
have higher agency costs than those of domestic companies. 
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